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U.S. Army War College
		
National Bureau of Asian Research

EXPLORING THE “RIGHT SIZE” FOR CHINA’S MILITARY:
PLA MISSIONS, FUNCTIONS, AND ORGANIZATION
Compiled by
Justin B. Liang and Sarah K. Snyder
The National Bureau of Asian Research

Key Points:
• Sustained and large increases in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defense budget are likely
in coming years as increasing national-level demands for new PLA missions require increasing
capability.
• “Surprise” PLA modernization programs—such as the 2004 Yuan-class submarine development—will
likely continue to emerge, particularly in those cases where service programs have not yet caught up to
national requirements.
• As modernization continues and systems become more complex, the human dimensions of the PLA—
education, training, personnel management—become more critical.

On October 6, 2006, more than 60 leading experts on China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) convened at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for a two-day discussion of the drivers of PLA force modernization. The 2006
PLA Conference was co-sponsored by National Bureau of Asian Research and the Strategic Studies Institute of
the U.S. Army War College. Entitled “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions,
and Organization,” the conference explored continuities and discontinuities in the forces driving PLA force
modernization, assessed how current modernization efforts are linked to national requirements, and examined
what such development reveals about China’s national defense strategies.
Current trends in Chinese defense spending—a decade and a half of double-digit growth, and a 15 percent
expenditure increase from 2005-06—suggest a major effort to modernize PLA military capabilities. This dramatic
force modernization has the attention of both regional and international communities. Is there a systematic plan
to this bold buildup that implements a national strategy? What is the appropriate “size” for China’s military, in
terms of manpower and capabilities, given the missions the PLA has been handed, and what are the implications
for the Asia-Pacific region and the United States?

Participants approached these questions by looking
at the current needs, wants, and haves of the PLA on
a service-by-service basis. By debating the rationale
for stated needs, an understanding of current efforts
becomes clearer—and a more lucid picture of the
“right size” for the PLA emerges. What does this final
collage, layering rhetoric on reality, tell us about the
transparency of the PLA? Is there consistency between
PLA doctrine development and force structure
modernization?

strategy concerned foremost with regional security and
with contingencies arising from U.S. interests in the
region.
A human element, however, may widen the gap
between the Army’s wants and needs. Party loyalty,
institutionalized both through the political officer
system and the party committee system, is critical
to successful operations. With the current trends in
personnel downsizing, the increasing incidence of
corruption, and the subsequent low morale among
troops, human resource development—in quality as
well as quantity—becomes crucial. The lack of a cadre
of capable noncommissioned officers compounds the
Army’s challenge.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) possesses a different
set of haves, wants, and needs. With the potential threat
of high-tech air forces around China’s periphery—from
the United States, Russia, Japan, and India—as well as
the challenge of winning a possible air campaign against
Taiwan, the PLAAF has shifted its focus to prepare
for offensive missions, including the advancement of
strike capabilities, from fighters to strategic bombers.
Like the Army, it currently possesses a mix of older
equipment and modern systems. Meanwhile, PLAAF
officers are better represented in the senior ranks of
PLA leadership.
Three factors are affecting the Air Force’s “needs
versus wants” debate. First, the PLAAF must decide
whether to downsize to a smaller, more lethal force—
while building force multipliers like airborne early
warning (AEW) and aerial refueling—or, alternatively,
to maintain large numbers of less capable but cheaper
systems. A second question relates to how the
PLAAF reconciles its internal and external needs,
as technology requirements are complicated by the
agenda of the domestic defense industry to advance its
own capabilities. Finally, the PLAAF must agree on
a division of labor within the PLAN Air Force, more
thoughtfully delegating personnel for defense missions
and defining who gets priority on new acquisitions.
These trade-offs have implications for the PLAAF
modernization efforts, creating the possibility of interforce tension and exacerbating issues of technology
compatibility, communication, and even training.
Meanwhile, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is developing
in areas where threats and interests coincide. Among
these drivers are, once again, deterring Taiwan’s move
toward independence and protecting the sea lines of

Sizing It All Up: PLA “Haves” Versus
“Wants” and “Needs.”
The PLA’s four arms—Army, Air Force, Navy,
and strategic systems—in recent years have matured,
but their “wish lists” and rationales for modernization
differ. Army modernization appears to fit within the
framework of a force preparing for a range of missions.
These include preparation for potential conflict over
Taiwan (with deterring Taiwan’s moves toward
secession as a first priority); stability on the Korean
peninsula; border defense; and, most importantly,
potential conflict with the United States over the abovementioned interests.
As the ground forces still constitute two-thirds
of the PLA, the modernization of conventional land
capabilities presents both major challenges and
opportunities. Ground forces comprise 35 maneuver
divisions and 45 maneuver brigades and have a wide
range of missions—spread over a vast territory from the
western border with India to central Asia and beyond.
Managing the disparate missions and types of ground
forces has resulted in a “hybrid” mix, blending old and
new capabilities, unit organizations, and equipment.
The bureaucratic domestic competition over scarce
defense resources likely has prevented the systematic
analysis of an uneven modernization effort among the
ground forces in China’s seven military regions. One
trend that has captured analysts’ attention is the PLA’s
acquisition and deployment of newer helicopters,
including Russian Mi-17s, that allow the PLA to
project presence more easily and rapidly.
Training—increasingly conducted through evermore sophisticated simulators—emphasizes amphibious operations, border defense, disaster relief, and
perhaps the beginnings of PLA-style close-air support.
Again, these activities seem to implement a long-term
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communication—long-term challenges that require
significant force modernization. While China’s military
strategy historically has been land-based, the PLAN
now seems to be assuming a defensive posture, not
unlike the Cold War Soviet model of maintaining sea
control to the “first island chain,” or about 200 miles
out. The PLAN may be moving toward a strategy of
sea denial, developing maneuverable medium-range
ballistic missiles to bulwark the “second island chain”
about 1,000 miles out.
The importance of amphibious warfare to China’s
emerging sea control/sea denial strategy is paramount,
to be sure, but doubts still linger about the PLAN’s
ability to employ its new weapons under real conditions.
If asymmetries in technology affect operations, the
PLAN may have more problems than it bargained for.
Nevertheless, the pace of modernization indicates that
naval modernization remains a very high priority for
the PLA.
Drivers of strategic systems are consistent with
China’s broader long-term security interests; they involve issues of prestige and coercive/deterrent capabilities. Of late, for example, the PLA has been developing a more articulate version of the second artillery
nuclear doctrine. It asserts that the role of nuclear
weapons is deterrence-oriented, designed to mitigate
costs incurred from employing conventional warfare.
In terms of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers,
Intelligence,
Surveillance,
and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR), the PLA may only be 2 to
5 years from reaching the level of networking that
U.S. forces possess today. Indeed, the information war
already has begun, and sophisticated acts of spying and
espionage occur daily in cyberspace.
China makes little effort to veil its desire to develop
systems capable of challenging those of the United
States, the “gold standard” against which warfare capabilities currently are measured. Official pronouncements
and literature suggest Beijing is exploring ways
to apply ancient Chinese military doctrine to the
information age in five domains: land, maritime, air,
space, and cyberspace. To this effect, there seems to
be consistency between strategic systems doctrine
development and force structure modernization—that
is, a reasonable degree of transparency between what
the PLA has, what it wants, and why.

Conclusion.
The most pressing threats to China’s security are
domestic, including the challenges of separatism,
particularly with Taiwan; increasing protests over
corruption; and nontraditional and transnational threats
such as terrorism, pandemics, and narcotics. While
pressing, however, none of these in its own right drives
PLA modernization. Similarly, in terms of external
threats, neither territorial disputes—a long-standing
historical concern of China’s—nor an unfavorable
regional environment seem to dictate certain
modernization efforts. Rather, successful diplomatic
implementation of a “good neighbor” policy of active
engagement appears to be bearing fruits for China and
its regional objectives. China seems poised to develop
a network of friendly, economically interdependent
neighbor states aligned in ways favorable to Beijing.
Most importantly, then, China worries that it has no
ability to provide its own security of the international
sea lines of communication, through which flow the
maritime commerce fueling the engines of China’s
meteoric economic growth (including ever-increasing
amounts of energy products). Here, the United States
has the greatest potential to damage China. China’s
response has been to develop the bilateral relationships
that defray this potential threat while amassing
considerable naval capabilities of its own.
Ultimately, the current security landscape offers an
ideal juncture for China and its military. With a relatively
benign threat environment, the PLA can pursue military
modernization largely unconstrained, orienting itself
towards potential and long-term threats—especially the
United States. Yet, modernization efforts and rationale
vary among the PLA’s different arms, and by layering
“needs” over “haves”—and scrutinizing the doctrines
supporting them—a picture of discrepancies emerges.
As the PLA grapples with the human elements of force
modernization, steep learning curves in technological
advances, and an increasingly wary international
community, it will be pressured in the coming years to
align its “walk” with its “talk.”
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****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position
of the Department of the Army, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government. This colloquium brief
is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
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